The 1960s constituted the golden years of Turkish cinema in terms of film production and movie attendance. Movie-going in those years was the principal family entertainment and leisure activity, mainly due to a lower cost than other social entertainment such as going to music halls. Supplying moviegoers with 200 to 300 films a year, ranging from melodramas to comedies, historical action and adventure to detective and gangster films, combined with the phenomenal popularity of its film stars (Mutlu, 2006) , Turkish cinema constituted an important domain of identity formation and negotiation acknowledged by the very institution of censorship. How did censorship as an extension of the secular state attempt to regulate or transform the representation of religion in films, and thereby the subject positions available to viewers?
The article begins with an overview of the history and politics of Turkish secularism from the early republican period to the early 1970s. It then provides a brief history of film censorship in Turkey. This is followed, first, by an examination of the censorship of religious elements in secular films -that is, films (from any genre, be it melodrama, action adventure or comedy) that did not have a main religious topic -and, second, by a discussion of the censorship commission's attitude towards religion in historical religious films that peaked in Turkish cinema in 1965. The article later considers the censorship of folk Islam in both secular and religious films. The censorship commission's strict attitude towards the depiction of religion in secular films set in modern times, its tolerant but corrective attitude towards historical religious films and its rejection of folk Islam in both secular and religious films, suggest that commission members saw themselves not only as guards of Kemalist secularism (pushing Islam out of the public sphere), but also of a 'true' Islam (a personal, enlightened, apolitical, national and Sunni Islam). This ambivalent attitude underlines 'Turkish Islamic exceptionalism' -that is, the interpenetration of Islam and secularism in Turkey that distinguishes it from Arab Islam (Mardin, 2005: 148) as well as from western models of secularism. The article concludes with a discussion of two inspection cases in 1970, which point to a significant shift in the censorship's attitude towards religion in films and which prove that the founding principle of secularism and its later politics in the 1960s did not distance the country from its Islamic heritage.
Historical background: the politics of Turkish secularism, 1920s-1960s
The Turkish revolution of 1923, which marked a change from monarchy to republic, was 'primarily a revolution of values' (Mardin, 1971: 209) in that it attempted to change not just the social structure but the symbolic system of society: namely its culture, within which Islam played a fundamental role (Mardin, 1971) . Viewing modernization and westernization as inseparable and inevitable, the founders of the Republic -led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) -saw Islam as a sign of 'backward' oriental identity and as a 'reactionary' social force, and believed that in order to modernize and westernize they had to eliminate the influence of Islam from society (Sayyid, 1997) . Assuming secularism (lâiklik, from the French laïcité) as one of its founding principles, the Republican People's Party government undertook many reforms in order to distance the country from its Ottoman/Islamic/ 72 European Journal of Cultural Studies 15(1) eastern past and bring it closer to contemporary western societies. 2 Reforms included the abolition of the caliphate (1924) , the abolition of the religious courts (1924) , the abolition of traditional religious schools and the establishment of a secular system of education (1924) , the dissolution of religious orders and brotherhoods (1925) , the proscription of the fez and other Islamic headgear and their substitution with the western hat (1925), the adoption of the Western calendar (1925) and the Latin alphabet (1928), the replacement of Shari'a law with civil, commercial and penal codes based on European models (1926) , which also granted women the right to vote and legal equality with men, the abolition of the clause in the constitution that recognized Islam as the religion of the Turkish state (1928) , and the proscription of the Arabic ezan (call to prayer) and its replacement with a Turkish translation (1932) .
These modernizing and secularizing reforms, especially the replacement of the fez and other Islamic headgear with the western hat, and the replacement of the conventional Arabic call to prayer with the Turkish version, caused insurrections in Anatolia by Islamic groups, which were quickly repressed via physical violence and/or legal punishment. Consequently, religion came to be encoded not only as a popular reactionary force but also as a counter-ideology and source of political opposition (Brockett, 1998; Tapper, 1991; Tarhanlı, 1993; Toprak, 1981; Turan, 1991) . Disapproving of Islam as a political ideology and as a source of collective identity and solidarity, the republicans attempted to relegate Islam to the private sphere and minimize its role in public arena by defining religion only as a matter of individual conscience, belief and worship (Tapper, 1991; Tarhanlı, 1993) . This push was a part of the project of creating an identity for Turkey as Turkish rather than Muslim, as is also observed in Atatürk's description of the Turkish revolution: 'the nation has united as individuals instead of being united by religion and as adherents of sects [religious orders]; now they are held together only by the bond of Turkish nationality' (cited in Kili, 2003: 249) .
Although the state rejected religion as a national marker, it was also aware that Islam, which had provided both the governing and living principles in the country for centuries, could not be eradicated completely from social life. Therefore, rather than excluding Islam altogether, the state put it under its control and incorporated it into state ideology by discursively constructing an official version of Islam (a personal, enlightened, apolitical and national Islam) that would be compatible with a modern secular worldview and implant the modern ideas and ideals of the republic (Çınar, 2005; Dumont, 1987; Göle, 1997; Kaplan, 2005) . Through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, established in 1924, the state regulated the training and appointment of religious officials and administered mosques, even supplying imams (prayer leaders) with sermons giving civic messages conforming to republican ideals (Ayata, 1996; Mardin, 1977; Turan, 1991) . Moreover, in an attempt to minimize the influence of Islam in public life, religion was defined only as a matter of private belief and conscience (Tarhanlı, 1993) and 'the public sphere [was] institutionalized and imagined as a site for the implementation of a secular and progressive way of life', leading to the silencing of any religious signs and practices (Göle, 2002: 176-177) . Consequently, Turkish secularism differed from Anglo-American models of secularism, in that rather than fully separating the state and religion, the state posited itself as the only authority able to determine the legitimate expression of religion in the public arena.
A radical secularism continued until the mid-1940s. The transition to a multiparty system in 1945 and the victory of the Centre-Right Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) in the 1950 elections marked a turning point in the official understanding of secularism. Identifying itself with the rural population, peasantry and small-town people, the Democrat Party underplayed cultural modernization, emphasized economic development and believed in a less repressive secularism (Sunar, 2004; Toprak, 1981) . Revoking the 1932 ban on performing the call to prayer in Arabic, allowing recitation of the Qur'an on state radio, incorporating optional religious courses into school curricula and opening İmam-Hatip (prayer leader and preacher) schools to train mosque personnel were among the Democrat Party's attempts to appeal to the masses through the religion issue (Tarhanlı, 1993; Toprak, 1981) . In addition, the Party encouraged the construction of mosques and establishment of Qur'anic schools. They allowed religious orders (outlawed in 1925) to openly practice their activities (Toprak, 1981) . Eroğul (1970) , the author of the first monograph in Turkish on the Democrat Party, remarks that its leaders never supported a theocratic system of governance, but used religion for political ends by tolerating reactionary attitudes as long as they did not threaten the state. On the other hand, Ahmad notes that although the early Democrat Party liberalized religion without sacrificing Kemalist reforms, it 'began to exploit Islam more explicitly ' (1977: 370-371) when it began to lose public support due to the worsening economic situation. Overall, the Party's liberal policy towards religion and religious groups was perceived anxiously by its opponents as undermining the modern secular legacy of the republic (Dumont, 1987) . Beginning in 1958, religious activity and reactionary manifestations increased. In May 1960, the Democrat government was overthrown by the military and the officers eventually defined military intervention as a 'continuation and reassertion of secularism' (Karpat, 1970 (Karpat, : 1671 .
After a period of coalition governments supervised by the strictly secularist military, in 1965 electoral politics resumed and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) came to power. The Justice Party was a continuation of the Democrat Party in terms of its liberal and populist attitude towards religion (Sunar and Sayari, 1986) , and it remained in power until 12 March 1971, when the military intervened once again.
Film censorship in Turkey
There was no law regulating film censorship until 1932, however the city governors of the Ministry of the Interior were authorized to censor films. Prior to public exhibition, each film was examined by two police officers in the cinema where it would be exhibited. In 1932, film censorship was centralized and put under the supervision of two film control commissions established in Istanbul and Ankara. Moreover, censorship was extended to cover the control of screenplays prior to shooting. In 1939, the Regulations on the Control of Films and Film Screenplays was formulated based on the 1934 Police Duty and Authorization Law and executed with only minor revisions until 1977. According to these new regulations, foreign films were controlled by the Film Control Commission in Ankara or Istanbul, depending on the customs office to which they were submitted, whereas domestic films and screenplays were controlled by the Central Film Control Commission in Ankara, which was superior to both city control commissions. In the case of any objection to the decision of the city control commission, or if no decision
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European Journal of Cultural Studies 15(1) was reached, foreign films could be submitted for re-examination to the Central Film Control Commission, whose decision was final. However, the importer of the film could apply to the Supreme Council finally for a revision (Anonymous, 1939; Onaran, 1968; Özgüç, 1976; Tikveş, 1974) .
The Central Film Control Commission, whose reports constitute the primary source material in this article, comprised five members from the Ministry of the Interior (head), the police, general staff of the army, Ministry of Tourism and Ministry of Education. Depending on the film's subject matter, additional temporary members representing, for example, the Ministry of Commerce, Directorate of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Health and so forth may have joined the Commission. The identities of the Commission members imply that films in Turkey were censored mainly by the government, police and military. Censorship commissions 3 functioned as guardians of the official national and cultural identity constructed by the state and projected on its citizens. Therefore, censorship reports provide useful and completely unexplored sources for examining the state's attitude towards various issues in practice, including the issue of religious expression.
The process unfolded as follows. First, the censorship commissions inspected a screenplay and later, if the film were allowed to be shot, the final product. In order to gain the Commission's approval for production and exhibition, a film should avoid:
1. political propaganda related to a state; 2. degrading an ethnic community or race; 3. hurting the sentiments of fellow states and nations; 4. propagating religion; 5. propagating political, economic and social ideologies that contradict the national regime; 6. contradicting public decency, morality and national sentiments; 7. reducing the dignity and honour of the military and propagating against the military; 8. being harmful to the order and security of the country; 9. provoking crime; and 10. including scenes that may be used to propagate against Turkey.
Based on these 10 criteria, which were also known as the 'Ten Commandments' of Turkish film censorship, the Commission, via majority voting, might accept or reject a film or ask for some revisions, sometimes describing specifically how a scene should be shot, what the characters should or should not say, how the film should end, and so forth. The criteria were not only very nationalistic but also so vague and paranoid that almost any film could be rejected if a commission desired. Yet despite all efforts, the commissions' control over films was not absolute, because sometimes the inspection copy of a film could be different from the one screened to the public. Since there was no regular inspection mechanism to control the films exhibited in cinemas, filmmakers were able to alter their films once they passed censorship. Arguably, film censorship had been one of the major obstacles to the development of a strong social and political critique in Turkish cinema. In addition, it had been the target of harsh criticism among filmmakers and critics. In 1963, the Turkish Workers' Party went to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the censorship regulations contradicted the main principles of the 1961 constitution, particularly the 21st article which guaranteed the freedom of science, art and information. However, the Constitutional Court decided the opposite (Özek, 1967; Tikveş, 1966) . Two new regulations came into force in 1977 and 1983 respectively, but they did not bring more freedom to filmmakers (Çimen, 1977; Dönmez, 1986; Tatar, 1979) . In 1986, the introduction of the Law of Cinema, Video and Music Works of Art and the Regulation on the Control of Cinema, Video and Music Works of Art, which amended the 1939 regulation, marked a major turning point in film censorship in Turkey. For the first time, regulation of film censorship was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Moreover, the Control Commission included a representative from the Professional Union of Film Producers, Importers and Cinema-owners and an artist from the cinema industry, in addition to representatives from the Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sports, the General Secretariat of the National Security Council and Ministry of the Interior (Anonymous, 1989; Onaran, 1992 Onaran, -1993 .
A gradual relaxation throughout the 1990s culminated with a new cinema law and regulation in 2005, which totally eliminated film censorship and replaced it with a classification system.
The history of censorship in Turkey is a very old one, which extends beyond the censorship of films. However, film censorship, which is discussed in this article only with respect to the censorship of religion, occupies a large but underexplored place in this history. 4 The censorship reports are full of interesting, sometimes tragi-comic, instances of censorship ranging from the censorship of nudity and sex to that of 'communist propaganda'. Since one of the principal aims of this article is to extend state-centred research on Turkish secularism from political history to cultural history, in what follows we consider only the censorship of religion and focus on the censorship of direct references to Islam, such as portrayals of religious officials, rules and rituals in both secular and religious films. 5 Yet the reader will still have an idea about the general mentality and motivations of the now-outdated film censorship in Turkey.
Secular films set in modern times: clearing religion off the public sphere
Throughout the 1960s, censorship reports exhibited a strict reaction towards depicting religious elements in secular films set in modern times. For example, the commissions disapproved of showing namaz (ritual prayer), the sound of ezan and showing or mentioning the Qur'an in modern daily life. Scenes involving such religious elements were rejected on the grounds that they exploited religion and religious feelings. 6 It would seem that this situation contrasts with the abundance of religious elements in the films of the 1950s, during the administration of the Democrat Party, which had a liberal and populist attitude towards religious expression. For example, the ezan was a common aural element in 1950s village melodramas -also known in critical discourse as 'belly [dancing], cemetery, ezan films' (Şener, 1976: 65; Atay, 1990; Özön, 1995) . In the 1950s, the ezan, which the Democrat Party proudly restored to its original Arabic version as soon as it came to power, signified more than a call to prayer. It was a political symbol marking the end of the 'tyranny' of the strictly secular Republican People's Party and was highly welcomed by the people. 7 The ezan, mosques and ritual prayer were among the most repeated elements in films of the 1950s. Moreover, in some extreme cases, the cinema could turn into a place of religious ritual. For example, Anatolian audiences were reportedly invited to watch Hac Yolu (Road to Hajj, 1953), a highly popular local appropriation of the Egyptian film El-Hac, seven times in order to become a hajji without going to Mecca. It was also reported that audiences performed ablution and walked around the cinema seven times before watching the film and that they were served rosewater (sometimes used for religious purposes in Islam) during the entr'actes (Anonymous, 1954; Özön, 1995; Sırmalı, 1953; ) .
Film critics and intellectuals of the 1950s perceived the use or 'abuse' of religion in films as cinematic expression of the religious revival incited by the Democrat Party government, and ironically criticized the 'looseness' of censorship that was supposed to prohibit religious propaganda (Anonymous, 1960) . Against this background, the 1960s censorship commissions' reactions towards ezan, ritual prayer and the Qur'an in films could be read as an attempt to reassert Kemalist secularism that was supposedly violated by the Democrat Party government. However, an examination of the censorship reports of the 1950s suggests that this period was also strict about portraying religion in films. Ritual prayer, ezan, the Qur'an, the imam, Muslim hymns and any kind of superstitious beliefs and practices were disapproved of in 1950s films as well. 8 This understanding invalidates the common supposition that the censorship commissions under the influence of the government were more tolerant towards religion in films. The abundance of religious elements in the films of the 1950s rather suggests that filmmakers and exhibitors did not always obey the revisions required by the censorship commissions during exhibition.
In the 1960s, the censorship commissions were resistant towards showing an imam or hoca (cleric or the preacher of a mosque) as well as showing an imam nikâhı (religious marriage ceremony) in secular films set in modern times. 9 However, portrayal of the hoca was tolerated as long as it served to affirm republican ideology and discourse, which encoded his religion as an obscurantist and reactionary force and thus an obstacle to modernization and progress. The hoca had been a negative stereotype in Turkish cinema since the early years (the 1920s). 10 The supreme example of this negative stereotype is found in Vurun Kahpeye (Beat the Bitch), which is based on the novel of the same title by the female republican writer Halide Edip Adıvar. Set during the Turkish War of Independence, the story is about Aliye, an idealist female teacher (one of the symbols of modern, enlightened, republican Turkey) who is appointed to an Anatolian village where she endures the negative reactions of conservative villagers, especially those of Hajji Fettah, an obscurantist, pro-sultan and pro-Greek hoca. Provoked by Hajji Fettah who, because Aliye is unveiled, sees her as immoral, the villagers stone her to death at the end. When inspecting the 1964 version of the film, 11 the censorship commission stayed silent about the portrayal of the hoca (which confirmed the republican discourse) and accepted the film on the condition that its Muslim hymns either be removed or replaced with a march expressing the nationalist feelings of the time. The commission also decreed that the cries of 'Allah u Akbar' ('God is Great') should be removed. Apparently, the commission did not care about the fact that the film was set in a period before the existence of the republic. The commission's 'corrections' mainly conformed to the ideology of the Kemalist state, which hailed its citizens as nationalist Turks before being Muslims. Overall, censoring the ritual prayer, ezan, the Qur'an, the imam, the imam nikahı and the hoca in secular films set in modern times (and sometimes even in those set before the republic came into existence), could be seen as the secular state's insistence on negating the function of religion in organizing social life.
The censorship reports are not without contradictions. For example, while the censorship commissions were resistant towards references to religion in secular films, they disapproved of rebelling against Allah or slighting his greatness and respectability. Dialogue such as 'What kind of Allah is this?', 'I like my daughter more than I like Allah', 'Damn God', 'We come before Allah' and 'I begged not Allah but man' were rejected on the grounds that they contradicted 'our national and moral values'. 12 The commissions' reservations about Allah indicated that despite its strict stand on the secularization of social life, the state did not promote irreligion; rather, it attempted to redefine the place of religion in modern Turkish society. Accordingly, as explored above, while religion was negated as part and principle of modern public life, it was affirmed as long as it stayed as a private belief in and respect for Allah.
Historical religious films: pushing religion to a mythical past
A more positive attitude towards religion is observed in the control of historical religious films that depicted the lives of Muslim saints and prophets (i.e. Job, Joseph, Ali, Abraham, John the Baptist and Solomon). These films constitute a popular trend that peaked in Turkish cinema in 1965, the year when the Justice Party came to power. Among the 17 historical religious films examined by the censorship commission, nine were immediately accepted without any reservations directly relating to religion, 13 despite the abundance of elements such as the ritual prayer, ezan and the Qur'an, which were prohibited in secular films. 14 15 At first look, the acceptance of historical religious films beginning in 1965 implies a shift in the state's and, consequently, in the censorship commissions' attitude towards religion under the influence of the new Justice Party government. However, we would argue that this attitude still parallels Kemalist secularism because it mainly confines religion to a mythical past. As the earlier discussion of the censorship of religion in secular films suggests, religion was still seen 16 the commission demanded that the film should begin with on-screen text that read: 'The events in this film took place before the republic.' Similarly, in the case of Ali ile Gül -Hak Aşıkları (Ali and Gül -Lovers of God), the commission demanded that the film should begin with on-screen text that read: 'The story is not based on truth, but on legend. ' If a historical religious film was rejected, this was because the film included 'misinformation' or 'mistakes' about the history, principles and rules of Islam and/or about the identity and life of the religious figure being portrayed. The corrective attitudes of the commissions suggest that besides supporting pushing Islam out of the public arena, the commissions saw themselves as guards of a 'correct' Islam. For example, Mevlûd (Mawlid) Süleyman Çelebi 17 was examined by a commission that included two representatives of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and rejected on the grounds that Mawlid (poems praising the birth of Muhammad, his life and his virtues, written by Süleyman Çelebi around AD 1400) 18 was not recited in the right melodic and rhythmic pattern and that the pronunciation of some Qur'anic verses (ayet) were wrong. The commission also demanded the omission of the lines 'the Qur'an should be translated into the language of Turkish Islamic people' and 'our book should be translated into the language spoken by our people', and their replacement with 'our book should be explained very well in Turkish'. This intervention suggests that the commission insisted on the old and, to some extent, non-Kemalist idea that that the Qur'an could not be translated, only interpreted. Translating the Qur'an into Turkish had been a controversial issue since the late 19th century. A traditional belief was that since the Qur'an was revealed in Arabic, its divine qualities would disappear if it were translated into any other language (Wilson, 2009) . The debate over whether translation was possible or desirable became hotter in the republican era, especially after 1924 when the first Turkish translations appeared. Despite all the Kemalists' efforts to legitimize the value of worshipping in Turkish, including a failed state-sponsored project of translating the Qur'an, beginning in the 1930s Qur'an translation projects could only take the form of exegeses (meâl) and commentaries (tefsir) (Azak, 2008a; Wilson, 2009) .
Remarkably, the majority of historical religious films rejected were those portraying historical and religious figures revered strongly especially by the Anatolian Alevis, which constitutes a large sect within Islam and Turkey and whose saints, beliefs and practices are different from those of the Sunni orthodoxy. 19 It must be noted that these films were not about Alevism per se. As Odabaş (2004) (Vorhoff, 1998: 228, 230 Anotalian Alevism, the censorship commission identified the following 'mistakes': reciting the ezan after sunrise, talking during recitation of the ezan, reading the Qur'an without reciting 'Bismillah' (in the name of Allah), performing ablution while standing, and incorrectly pronouncing shahadah (Arabic recitation of 'I testify that there is no God but Allah and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah'). Allahın Arslanı Hz. Ali (Ali, Allah's Lion), a film about the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law Ali, one of the most important figures in Alevi Islam, was rejected on the grounds that it included many mistakes regarding the history and principles of Islam. In addition to showing bareheaded praying and violations of the rules regarding collective prayer, the commission argued that the film misrepresented 'our religion' and Ali. It was noted that Ali was a 'true hero' but the film portrayed him as a 'miserable lazy poor person'. The commission also felt uncomfortable with the violence and hate-related dialogue in fight scenes. Therefore, discoursing on Muslim morality, the commission argued that 'Islam forbids Muslim people to kill each other', and 'it is inappropriate for a Muslim to say to an infidel "I will send you to hell"'. Similarly, Eba Müslümi Horasani, another central figure to Alevi Islam, was rejected on the grounds that it included misinformation about the lives of Muslim prophets and that lines such as 'in the name of God, in the name of Muhammad, in the name of Ali', 'let's fight for Ali' and 'we will avenge the bloodshed at Kerbela' in fight scenes could generate 'conflict and chaos'. 20 Violent content in those films must be related to the fact that for many Alevis, the Alevi history is a chain of 'tragedies' or of 'collectively suffered injustices' beginning with the battle of Kerbela (Vorhoff, 1998: 227) . However, the censorship commissions had always been sensitive about the depiction of violence in films that figured Alevi saints. Several films in the 1950s and 1970s were rejected on the grounds that they could lead to clashes between different religious sects, namely between Sunnis and Alevis. 21 In order to avoid such clashes, the censorship commissions attempted to guarantee that the films would not offend Sunni sensitivities by cleaning them of any sectarian connotations and making the religious content compatible with the religious norms of Sunni Islam.
Rejection of folk Islam: where the religious and secular meet
The only theme that the commissions were consistently against both in secular and historical religious films, including films representing Alevi figures, was the depiction of folk or unofficial Islam: a set of popular, mystical beliefs, rituals and activities that were categorized by the secular state and the Islamic orthodoxy as superstition and rejected for the sake of a modern society and a 'true' Islam. The censorship commissions rejected filmic depictions of folk Islamic practices, such as veneration of saints and pilgrimages to and devotional activities in their shrines or graves (turbes or yatırs), on the grounds that they exploited religious feelings. 22 Additionally, depictions of elements of folk religion such as rain prayer, amulets, spells (büyü) and miracles and especially their association with religious figures such as clerics, prophets or saints were socially harmful because, the commissions argued, they transgressed reason and blurred the distinction between religion and superstition. 23 The censorship commissions were against the filmic depictions of folk Islam not only to protect modern, secular, positivist society but also to 80
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protect a 'true' Islam. Besides folk Islamic practices, filmic references to religious orders and brotherhoods, known as tarikats ('way' or 'path') and outlawed in 1925, also were rejected. 24 As Lewis remarks, folk Islam found its chief expression in tarikats, to which 'the common people turned for help and guidance where orthodox Islam was lacking or deficient ' (1968: 404-405) . For years, as opposed to official Islam, tarikats represented peripheral and mystical Islam and were dismissed by the secular state for propagating 'incorrect' and 'ignorant superstitions' (Tapper and Tapper, 1987) . For the Kemalists, tarikats were an 'evil legacy from the past' (Lewis, 1968: 412) and the common people's, especially peasants', investments in them and in superstitions was a sign of their 'primitiveness' and 'backwardness', which could be eliminated by education and modernization resting on positive science (Tapper, 1991) . This perception also marks the quotation below from a speech delivered by Atatürk:
I flatly refuse to believe that today, in the luminous presence of science, knowledge and civilization in all its aspects, there exist, in the civilized community of Turkey, men so primitive as to seek their material and moral well-being from the guidance of one or other şeyh [tarikat leader]. Gentlemen, you and the whole nation must know and know very well, that the Republic of Turkey cannot be the land of şeyhs, dervishes, disciples and lay brothers. The straightest, truest Way (tarikat) is the way of civilization. (cited in Lewis, 1968: 410-411) Arguably, the resentment towards tarikats and their folk Islam was not simply a matter of rejecting them because they represented primitiveness. It also stemmed from the fact that they functioned as a rival source of legitimacy and thus were seen as reactionary and subversive. As Zürcher notes, besides providing a 'mystical, emotional dimension' that was lacking in orthodox Islam, tarikats also had a vital social function in that they served 'as networks offering cohesion, protection and social mobility ' (2007: 191-192) . Considering the fact that major revolts against modernizing reforms in the early 1920s and 1930s were led by various tarikat circles, it was vital for the modern secular state to keep these 'reactionary' and 'subversive' forces under control and to prevent their influence over the common people. One way to achieve this was to produce an official discourse that framed the tarikats' Islam as fake or false. In parallel with this official discourse, the censorship commissions rejected filmic depictions of tarikats and their folk Islam under the disguise of protecting a 'true' enlightened Islam compatible with modern ideals.
From the 1960s to the 1970s: shifting perceptions of religion
It is observed that throughout the 1960s the censorship commissions generally conformed to Kemalist secularism: they accepted Islam as a private abstract belief in Allah and a set of rules to be followed in worship, but negated Islam's social function as part and principle of modern public life. As mentioned previously, the secularist project suppressed public display of religiosity in order to establish a modern way of life and the censorship commissions insisted on removing any religious symbols and practice from public life depicted in films. When religion was allowed to be portrayed in films, it was either as a sign of obscurantism and reactionism (i.e. as in Vurun Kahpeye discussed above) or as a cultural and traditional element that symbolized a mythic past (i.e. as in historical religious films) that should be remembered 'correctly'. Interestingly, in their attempt to correct religious 'mistakes' in historical religious films, the commission members often used such expressions as 'our Prophet' or 'our religion', contradicting the fact that the secular state is not supposed to possess such a characteristic. Yet as Turan remarks, such terms, which also are used by Turkish political leaders, imply 'no religiosity and possibly not even belief, but the possession of what we may call "Islamic credentials" ' (1991: 39) . For the censorship commissions, Islam, when cleared of superstition and separated from politics and modern public life, still constituted an essential element of collective identity, tradition and memory. However, it must be noted that what the censorship commission called 'our religion' was predominantly a Sunni version of Islam. Overall, the censorship reports relating to the issue of religion constitute an opportunity to understand the particularity and complexity of Turkish secularism, which is still a debated issue in Turkey and beyond.
We would like to complete this article by discussing two inspection cases that point to a significant shift in the censorship commissions' attitude towards religion in the 1970s. Yılmaz Güney's Umut (Hope) occupies a special place among the secular films rejected for their depiction of religion. The film tells the story of Cabbar (Yılmaz Güney), a poor cart driver who struggles to make a living to support his large family. When his horse, his only means of earning a living, is hit by a car, Cabbar follows the advice of a friend and begins to search for a buried treasure under the guidance of a local hoca. He becomes increasingly dependent on the hoca's visions and directions, which do not bring the treasure but more misery. The film encodes Cabbar's decision to follow the hoca to improve his life instead of taking social and political action (for example, he rejects participating in a cart driver's strike) as false consciousness and disempowerment. It also criticizes a system that victimizes and pushes the poor and naive into the hands of hocas and leads them to seek salvation in superstition and false hopes. However, the censorship commission decoded the film in a different way, rejecting it on the grounds that it propagated religion and political, economic and social ideologies that contradicted the national regime, that it was harmful to the order and security of the country, it provoked crime and included scenes that might be used to propagate against Turkey. 25 The commission believed that the film discriminated between the rich and poor, promoted superstitious beliefs and 'ridiculed' religious worship and religious functionaries. For example, the film showed the hoca praying during sunrise: the commission stated that 'according to our religion, one does not pray during sunrise'. As discussed previously, similar corrections were made to other films, but for the first time the commission interpreted this not as a religious mistake but as ridiculing religion. Similarly, the image of the hoca in Umut, who was more human and not as evil as the 'deceiving' hocas in other films that passed the commissions' examinations, was seen as an attempt to ridicule religious functionaries. Arguably, the commission's stricter and inconsistent reaction to Umut was actually a reaction to Yılmaz Güney's Marxist identity and to the Marxist messages in the film, based on the supposition that Marxists are atheists or irreligious. 26 When faced with the 'threat' of communism, Islam was perceived as a counterforce that should be protected and defended.
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The same year Umut was banned, the censorship commission accepted Yücel Çakmaklı's Birleşen Yollar (Uniting Roads) despite the opposition of the police representative, who rejected the film on the grounds that it propagated religion. Different from historical religious films, Birleşen Yollar was set in the present and told the story of Feyza, an upper-class rich, modern, westernized, degenerate girl who is influenced by a lowerclass pious university boy, Bilal, to happily adopt the Islamic way of life and wear the hijab. The film criticized the Turkish modernization project as cosmetic westernization and promoted the Islamic way of life in modern Turkey as the only means to 'true' happiness. It also became the pioneer of the İslami Milli Sinema (Islamic National Cinema) movement of the 1970s, which introduced Islamic thought to Turkish cinema. 27 The commission's intolerant attitude towards Umut and tolerant attitude towards Birleşen Yollar (as well as to the latter's knock-offs that followed) seems to be related to anxieties over the rise of the radical Left that was beginning in the late 1960s, and to the mobilization of Islam as a remedy of social chaos. This shifting attitude towards depicting religion in films can be considered an early sign of the important social, cultural and political developments in Turkey that would gain momentum in the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention.
Until the 1980s, the military, the major protector of secularism in Turkey, had perceived public Islam as a threat to the modern secular legacy of the country. The 1980 military intervention and its aftermath signalled a shift in this perception. In an attempt to stop the ideological division between right-wing and left-wing groups, political violence in the streets and social chaos, the generals sought to 'reinvent a more politically docile Turkish youth' (Kaplan, 2005: 666) by mobilizing religion as a remedy for ideological polarization, especially communism. They drew on an intellectual movement called Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which merged Sunni Islam with Turkish nationalism. After a three-year military administration, with the new civil government led by Prime Minister Turgut Özal, Turkey entered a new era characterized by economic, social and cultural liberalization. Özal also saw Islam as a unifying element in society. Moreover, he sought to achieve 'real' social change, 'a change from below', by engaging all sections of society, including Islamic circles, in the modernization process (Robins, 1996: 73, 74) . To this end, he encouraged the greater participation of Islamic capital and Islamic circles in the economy and the public sphere. Combined with a phenomenal emigration from rural areas to the cities, which brought Islamic culture to the cities together with the Anatolian people, these developments paved the way for the revitalization of Islam in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s that would culminate first with the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party, and later with the still-continuing government of the Islamist Justice and Development Party.
Secularism in Turkey has never been simply the repression of religion, but rather a struggle over drawing and policing the boundaries of religion. The inconsistent, contradictory and shifting censorship of religion in films provide a historical and more complex insight into this continuing struggle in Turkey. The censorship reports of Umut and Birleşen Yollar show how the censorship of religion changed with changing political priorities, and how the officially secular state eventually came to rely upon religion by formally incorporating it into its ideology in order to endorse its power and legitimacy. Therefore, these reports also point forward to more recent developments, tensions and struggles in Turkish politics and culture.
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Notes
1. These reports are currently held in paper format by the Turkish Ministry of Culture, Directorate
General of Cinema and Copyrights in Ankara. They are not accessible to the general public.
Researchers who want to browse this material should apply to the Directorate in writing. 2. Although they were targeted to break with the past and create a new modern Turkey, the republican reforms did not mean an absolutely novel change, rather a continuation of the 19th-century Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876), which attempted to secularize and modernize administrative, judicial and educational institutions (Mardin, 1991) . In her discussion of the similarities between Ottoman and republican reforms, Bottoni (2007) aptly remarks that what most distinguish the republican reforms from the Ottoman ones are the explicit adoption of the principle of secularism as the official ideology, and the fast pace of the preparation and implementation of the reforms. The documentary includes many interviews with directors and producers as well as with some of the members of the censorship commissions. It shows how arbitrary and paranoid film censorship was in Turkey, and how censorship mechanisms changed with the changing political priorities of different periods. 5. Although issues such as censoring nudity and sex are relevant to the issue of religion as well, we do not cover these in this article because they were censored in all kinds of films in all periods under the general principle of preserving public decency and morality. For a discussion of the Republican People's Party government's ban on the ezan and the controversy it generated, see Azak (2008a Azak ( , 2008b 
